BARATH RAGHAVAN

It's not just that what we generally think of as free energy doesn't occur in nature, but also that free energy does occur in the everyday lived environments of people in industrial nations, which we might thus say are unnatural. So what are instances of free energy that we experience in our lives, and why do they matter?

Out of desperation for the climate, many prominent environmentalists converted to the religion of nuclear (fission) power between 2008-2011. Maybe this is a good time to rethink those deathbed conversions.

I thought I'd do a thought experiment. Suppose tomorrow morning a hypothetical university---let's call it T.I.M.---sends out their weekly press release claiming a "revolutionary breakthrough" that will change the way we think about energy. Unlike every other time in the past decade they've made this claim, though, suppose this time it's actually true: they've discovered a way of producing extremely cheap energy---as near to "free energy" as can be imagined.

Where will computing go in the coming years? I thought I should find out, so I watched a roundtable and other talks and interviews on the subject (warning: it's pretty dry stuff). I came away underwhelmed. I struggled to figure out what these guys were seeing that I wasn't. I'm not sure I've figured it out. Eventually I came back to the one key issue that's missing from their roundtable conversation---and that of most conversations among engineers in the computing world---limits, both ecological and material.

Many people who know about climate change know little about peak oil. Many who know about peak oil dismiss climate change. Why? How can two problems have roughly the same cause, potentially major global consequences, and be understood so poorly? Why do some people dismiss one and not the other? Is one group right and the other wrong? I'd like to take a shot at explaining this mystery from a few angles.

There's plenty of understanding that efficiency measures can sometimes (often) fail if they fall victim to Jevon's Paradox. The common response is that we need to couple efficiency measures with a carbon tax or similar policy that give people both the means and the incentive to decrease energy consumption. But let's look at the underlying goal of a carbon tax: to change behavior. How does it change behavior? By penalizing undesirable behavior (financially). The downside to a carbon tax is that it requires overcoming many political hurdles that don't seem likely to be overcome anytime soon. What are the alternatives?

In this post I'd like to begin to review Herman Daly's notion of how to build a steady-state economy (which were ahead of their time---the first edition was written in 1977). His ideas are both deep and simple at the same time, and should be a foundation for any future economic system.

We're at the end of growth. Growth of the economy, of consumption, of wealth. That this would happen isn't news to those who've followed the writings of Meadows, Heinberg, and many others. What's different now is that it may have actually arrived. I'd like to briefly look at our current situation in this context and synthesize the various ideas we explored in previous posts.

How fast do we need to transition off of fossil fuels? What industrial capacity is available today for different alternative energy technologies and what is likely to be available in the future? What might we do if we can't replace fossil fuels with alternatives fast enough, and what might the consequences be? I finally got around to re-doing these calculations, and wanted to go through the numbers.

In my last post, I looked at the Internet's energy use, broadly construed, and contended that we might offload other societal functions onto the Internet. In this post I'd like to consider in what ways that might be an unwise approach given the dependencies of the Internet.